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Imperial Incentives and Individual
Allegiances in Juan Antonio Correa’s
La pérdida y restauración de Bahía de
Todos los Santos
MATTHEW D. STROUD
Trinity University, Texas

Antonio Gramsci observed that the relative power of a nation can be
determined by a combination of four factors: territorial expansion, economic
power, military might, and ‘the ability of a state to set its activities on an
autonomous course so influential that other powers are bound to be affected by
it’.1 Among nations, an empire, practically by definition, stands at the pinnacle
of power and greatness, and its ability to influence actions is at an ever greater
distance from the centre of its authority. As it expands ever outward—through
marriage, conquest, inheritance, negotiation, or economic/ideological
dominance—it works ceaselessly to subordinate its disparate peoples and
polymorphous components to conform to an ideal of a single, monolithic,
homogeneous, and harmonious entity united in its goals, its loyalties, its
strategies and tactics, and its treatment of individuals. In carrying out this
project an empire requires to have at its disposal a variety of advantages and
techniques, including centralized governance, well-articulated social and
political hierarchies, cultural assimilation, indoctrination, and education, all
of which are intended to realise and reinforce its goals as the dominant power
and subdue or eradicate resistance through the imposition of a common
language, religion, law, and culture. Over a period of several generations, this
project of homogenization may produce genuine and lasting effects; one needs
to think only of what happened in the case of the Celtiberians when they were
Romanized, or to bear in mind the situation of the third or fourth-generation
descendants of immigrants in the United States who never acquire the
language of their grandparents and, except for racial and ethnic differences,
may be culturally indistinguishable from their peers whose families arrived
1 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. & trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg & Antonio
Callari, 2 vols (New York: Columbia U. P., 1992 96), II, 240.
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much earlier. In the short term, however, attempts to impose assimilation have
an uncertain, incomplete, or superficial outcome: one may learn another
language without forgetting the language of one’s childhood, and one may be
required to adopt a new religion without abandoning the beliefs and rites of
one’s previous faith.
Recent work in post-colonial cultural studies has gone a long way toward
dismantling the popular, even mythic, self-image that empire
characteristically seeks to reinforce both at home and abroad. But in
seeking to understand the complex nature of empire, it is not necessary to
limit oneself to focusing on the modern world. Indeed, it is clear from
examining early modern Spanish history and literature that not all members
of the Habsburg empire saw the world in the same way. A variety of different
people linked by the religion they shared, their cultural affinity, social class,
race, sex and sexual orientation meant that they often had very differing and
conflictive relationships with the empire and hegemonic culture that ruled
them. Even white, Catholic, Spanish males had different perceptions and
were treated differently depending on where they were born, what other
languages they spoke, what religion their great-grandparents observed, what
social classes they belonged to, whom they knew, and how much money they
had. These differences came into especially sharp relief during the sixty
years between 1580 and 1640, when, through a quirk of dynastic inheritance,
the territory under the control of the Spanish Hapsburgs virtually doubled
with the addition of Portugal and its colonies.
To enable us to focus more clearly on the nature of empire, its character,
and its effect on people, both as individuals and as cultures, let us look at an
important seventeenth-century military victory as depicted in one of the
artistic works created to celebrate it. Juan Antonio Correa’s little-known
work, La pérdida y restauración de Bahía de Todos los Santos is a play that
demonstrates that the Spanish Empire’s veneer of unity hides serious and
important political and cultural fault lines, which have effects even where
the quintessential activity of colonial warfare is concerned in which the
participants are most starkly divided into us and them, good and evil, lucky
and unlucky, winners and losers.
In May 1624, Dutch forces, aided by those of England and France, took
possession of Bahia de Todos os Santos, Brazil, the place known today as
Salvador. Since Bahia was the colonial capital and the centre of local
government and activity, its loss could not be accepted without an attempt
being made to regain it. As a result, just over one year later, an alliance made
up of Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitan soldiers and sailors, together with
indigenous Brazilians and blacks living in Bahia, retook the city. The
Spanish monarchy used this rare victory to proclaim that Spain and
Portugal, which by then had been jointly ruled over by the Spanish
Habsburg kings for nearly half a century, were stronger together than each
was on its own. The triumph was commemorated by a number of poems,
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paintings, and at least two dramas: Lope de Vega’s El Brasil restituido
and the much less famous play under consideration here.2 Correa’s play
follows the historical trajectory first dramatizing Portugal’s loss of its
territory to the Dutch, then dealing with the arrival of the allied fleet from
Europe, and the victory won under the leadership of the famous Spanish
general, Don Fadrique de Toledo, but in the play two subplots are added
involving love triangles that give rise to seditious activity by scorned lovers.
Both the historical battle itself and Correa’s play prompt a series of
questions.3 Why would people sacrifice themselves in order to advance or
protect the interests of peoples and nations that were not their own? Why
would, for instance, Italian soldiers from Naples pledge their loyalty and
their lives to the King of Spain and defend the far-flung outpost of Bahia
against Dutch encroachments? And why would English Catholics side with
Dutch Calvinists in Holland’s struggle for independence from Spain? Why is
there, too, so much more cohesiveness among those fighting on the side of
Spain than is evident among those fighting on the side of Holland? Why
would the marginalized, exploited, oppressed, vanquished, and dominated
peoples of Brazil lift a finger to support any European power, rather than
choosing instead to expend the same sort of effort to obtain their freedom and
independence? Why would a playwright born in Lisbon write a work in
Castilian celebrating a Spanish victory that came about because the
Portuguese had lost an important part of their territory in Brazil? Indeed,
one might also wonder why so many plays by Portuguese writers of the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including some that celebrated
Portugal’s liberation from Spanish rule in 1640, were written in Castilian?4
What factors are at play in such circumstances, affecting the relationship
between the individual and the society in question as demonstrated by
personal motivation, political allegiance, and even the existence of the play
itself?
All societies are to some degree or another diverse; at the very least they
contain both men and women, the young and the old, the strong and the
weak. For protection, companionship, and many other reasons, individuals
naturally form affinity groups that, for a variety of reasons, are unequal in
2 For a more detailed account of the loss and retaking of Bahia, as well as insight into
the importance of the victory to the prestige of Felipe IV and the union of Spain and Portugal,
see Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, ‘Observaciones preliminaries: III El Brasil restituido’, in
Obras de Lope de Vega, ed. & estudio preliminar de Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, 33 vols
(Madrid: [reprint] Atlas, 1963 1972), XXVIII (1970), BAE 233, 24 32.
3 It is the complexity of this multi layered plot structure, which provides greater
insight into the interplay of various competing incentives and motivations, that inspired this
study of Correa’s play in preference to Lope’s, which, while much better known, reads much
more like a straightforward news report combined with a degree of pro monarchy pageantry.
4 António Henrique R. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, Volume 1: From
Lusitania to Empire (New York: Columbia U. P., 1972), 323; Anna Klobucka, The Portuguese
Nun: Formation of a National Myth (Lewisburg: Bucknell U. P., 2000), 70.
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terms of size, power, and influence: the larger the society, and empires are
the extreme case, the greater the number of possible affinity groups.
Inherent inequalities among these groups allow one of them to become
dominant, its values deemed to be not just normal but universal, and its
actions perceived to benefit everyone even when they primarily benefit only
the dominant group concerned.5 The relative cultural power of the dominant
subgroup can be based on any number of factors, and sometimes these factors
can overlap to create even more firmly established elites; among those
accorded privileged status in different cultures are the nobles, the wealthy,
warriors, philosophers, priests, and the like. Because Correa’s work is a
military play, it comes as no surprise that noble officers have greater
authority, prestige, and importance than common soldiers. But the battle
for Bahia, both the historical event and the event as dramatized in Correa’s
play, reveals a much more intensive stratification based upon national,
cultural, military, linguistic and racial differences, all of which also existed
within the unified Iberian empire. The Spanish are accorded greater status
and power than the Portuguese; the Spanish king is the ruler over all, and
the commander of all the Iberian forces sent to retake Bahia is a Spaniard.
Portugal is clearly the lesser partner in the Iberian union. It was the
Portuguese who lost Bahia and, without aid from Spain, they could not have
reclaimed it. In the play, Portugal as a political entity is mentioned only
three times in the entire play, and Brazil only once, while ‘España’ is
referred to twenty-seven times.6 Catholicism is granted a status denied to
Protestantism; all those fighting for the Iberian alliance are considered to be
faithful to the Church of Rome and thus called ‘Christianos’ (I, 672; II, 170,
196, 605, 824; III, 166, 655, 821), and all the rest, regardless of their beliefs,
are branded as ‘hereges’ (II, 415, 458, 461, 492; III, 325, 644).
Difference based upon race is perhaps the most natural and visible factor
that serves starkly to divide people and assist their formation into social
categories. In the play, all Europeans are, of course, called ‘blancos’ (I, 677).
The most powerful members of both sides in the conflict are white Europeans
who are not only granted more status than black or indigenous Brazilians,
but who tend to share the same view of American lands as repositories of
treasures there for the taking and of indigenous Americans as inferior to
them in every way. Indeed, despite the fact that the ‘negros’ reportedly play
a pivotal role in the retaking of Bahia by attacking the invaders
spontaneously and with such great ferocity and bravery that no soldier
fighting for the Dutch is able to escape (I, 658–59, 685–88), they are given no
5 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 179 80.
6 See, by way of example, I, 707 and II, 444, in Juan Antonio Correa, La pérdida y
restauración de la Bahía de Todos los Santos, ed. & intro. de J. Carlos Lisboa, in Uma peça
desconhecida sôbre os holandeses na Bahia (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1961),
6 70. All references are to this edition and are given in the text, in the form of Act number,
followed by the line number.

J. A. CORREA’S LA PÉRDIDA Y RESTAURACIÓN DE BAHÍA

5

lines to speak and do not even appear on stage; their silence and invisibility
make it impossible to speculate about their motives or their allegiances, or
even to determine whether the description ‘negros’ is being used to refer to
the indigenous peoples of Brazil, or to the slaves of African origin or to their
descendants, or, indeed, to anyone who is different from the peoples of
Western Europe. The most one can say about the ‘negros’ in the play is that
they are only referred to in the aggregate, that references to them note their
otherness, that white Europeans rely upon them as one might rely on pawns
in a chess game; and, even when some ‘negros’ flee Bahia to take refuge on
Dutch ships (II, 21), in no case do they use their numbers and their abilities
to resist all Europeans in order to gain real freedom for themselves.
There are several possible logical explanations for this portrayal of the
‘negros’. First, the playwright might expect us to assume that the ‘negros’
were influenced as much by the cultural hegemony exercised by Europe as
were the Europeans themselves: by the social and religious education they
received, by the promises made that society would take care of them; perhaps
they even identified psychologically with those who had been their masters
for a century. Second, because the counterattack was led by the ‘negros, y
pocos blancos’ (I, 677), the playwright might have wished to avoid wounding
European pride by drawing attention to the fact that Europeans were being
led by those over whom they believed they had the divine right of mastery.
When Don Francisco recounts the attack at the beginning of Act 2, he
mentions only ‘los pocos Portugueses / que Vueselencia vé’ (II, 9–10), not only
failing to mention the leading role of the ‘negros’ in retaking the fort, but any
participation by them whatsoever. Third, the fact that there were also
‘negros’ to be found on the opposing Dutch side might have caused the
dramatist to underplay their historical role. He would not wish his audience
to question the loyalty of this group so important to the economic success of
the colonies. Any such doubts, were they to be raised, might have seriously
undermined the celebratory nature of the play and perhaps even the larger
imperial project which it dramatizes. After all, if the assumption is that the
good triumph and the bad are defeated, on which side would the ‘negros’ fall?
Imperial reliance on oppressed peoples was always a thorny issue: the
‘passive or active adherence’7 to the aims and methods of the empire, the
physical and emotional dependence of the underclass on those in power,8 and
even the substitution of more distant, more abstract imperial interests for
their own local, vital, and immediate interests9 were indispensable. The
oppressed are induced to ‘resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow
him’ and to internalize ‘the opinion the oppressors hold of them’,10 with the
7 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 91.
8 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, with a
Foreword by Richard Shaull (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 51.
9 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 184.
10 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 49.
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result that they accept their own ‘cultural inauthenticity’ and ‘begin to
respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders’,11
becoming ‘ambiguous beings “housing” another’12 and exhibiting the
‘existential duality of the oppressed, who are at the same time themselves
and the oppressor whose image they have internalized’.13
Gramsci speaks to both the efficacy of the mechanisms of cultural
hegemony and its inability to effect its aims: ‘even when [the subaltern
classes] rebel[,] they are in a state of anxious defense’.14 That there is any
possibility that the oppressed would rebel under any circumstance is an
acknowledgement that the assimilation of the ‘have-nots’ into the project of
the ‘haves’ is not without risk. The same subaltern groups on which the
empire depended were feared by those in power as marginal and
undependable; the masters could not rely upon their loyalty and had to
resort to harsh measures that did not conform to Renaissance values of
human dignity in order to exploit this workforce. In short, the empire was
usually loath to admit openly that its very success depended upon a
population it considered so inferior, marginal, and untrustworthy.15 A final
possible reason for underplaying their role and significance is the notion, so
prevalent at the time, that the ‘negros’ were such inferior beings that their
motivations were of no more concern to the Europeans than the motivations
of mules or oxen or other animals whose only value lay in the labour they
could provide. Correa’s play simply does not present people of colour as
complex characters or as being worthy of consideration and of more humane
treatment at the hands of Europeans.
Among the reasons why different, unequal, and even mutually suspicious
subgroups should join together in a common goal are several that reflect the
human subject’s engagement in both the imaginary and symbolic registers.
No healthy human subject can exist beyond the scope of the symbolic Other
that promises to establish its identity as an adult member of society, fulfil its
11 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 150.
12 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 134.
13 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 47.
14 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 21.
15 The silence and invisibility of the ‘negros’ in the play seem to be a clear example of
Freire’s ‘ “culture of silence” of the dispossessed’, as it is described by Richard Shaull (see his
‘Foreword’, in Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans Bergman Ramos, 10). In a very real
way, this lack of noticeable presence appears to support, in racial terms, Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak’s famous dictum, ‘The subaltern cannot speak’ (‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in
Colonial Discourse and Post Colonial Theory, ed. Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman [New
York: Columbia U. P., 1994], 104; see also Bruce R. Burningham, Tilting Cervantes: Baroque
Reflections on Postmodern Culture [Nashville: Vanderbilt U. P., 2008], 15). Frustrating as it
may appear to be, this presentation of the ‘other’ is, perhaps, a more enlightened one than
what Lope offers us in El Brasil restituido (Obras de Lope de Vega, ed. Menéndez Pelayo,
XXVIII, 257 96), a play that selects both traitorous conversos and capricious indigenous
peoples for condemnation (see especially 260a 62b, 267a 68a, 291a, 295b).
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desires, grant it the entitlements of office, provide answers to its existential
questions, and give the appearance of closing up the gaps at its core via the
acquisition of language, submission to the law, adherence to religious and
cultural norms, and compliance with the obligations imposed upon it for the
benefit of the larger group (society, country, church), all within a
hierarchical superstructure in which the individual works and sacrifices
in order to find validation through obedience. The symbolic demands,
necessary to the development of the human subject, are not inborn; they are
imposed upon the individual, in ways subtle and not so subtle, by the
outside social, cultural, legal, scientific, political and religious environment
that completely surrounds the individual. If one were to sum up this
symbolic promise in a simple sentence, it might be, ‘If you renounce your
own desires and do as you are told, you will have a peaceful, fruitful,
rewarding, and meaningful life’.16 The overt symbolic mechanisms for
uniting disparate peoples vary from the direct—application of a uniform
law, establishment of a universal faith, punishment for a lack of orthodoxy
—to the subtle, such as the semiotic codification of different styles of
clothing and the blurring of distinction through the use of a common
language. Since all of these are imposed upon a subject, they must be
taught; education, inculcation, and indoctrination are valuable tools not
just of empire but of all society: ‘the state has and demands consent, but it
also “educates” this consent’ at the behest of, and to consolidate the power
of, ‘the ruling class’.17 Just as the Conde-Duque de Olivares commissioned
works to consolidate support among the people for the royal projects of
Felipe IV, the Spanish clearly intuited the value of education as is evident

16 For specific references to those aspects of the symbolic noted here, see Jacques Lacan,
Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), 11, 24, 26 27, 42, 43, 60
61, 64 68, 80 82, 106, 124 27, 140 44, 148, 150, 155 58, 164 67, 172 73, 193 99, 232 34, 263
65, 281 82, 284 91, 296, 302 24; and Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I:
Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953 54, ed. Jacques Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (New
York: Norton, 1988), 69, 83 87, 102, 134, 140 42, 146, 155 57, 166, 171, 179, 185 86, 194, 217,
221, 222 23, 228, 242, 255, 262 65, 271 72, 276 77. For an overview of the symbolic register in
the context of a study of the comedia, see Matthew D. Stroud, The Play in the Mirror: Lacanian
Perspectives on Spanish Baroque Theater (Lewisburg: Bucknell U. P., 1996), 31 39, 49 50, 57
59, 63, 65 71, 107 09, 113 15, 126 29, 138, 181, 185 88, 215 29.
17 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, I, 153. Freire likewise discusses
the political and economic ‘myths’ necessary to the successful subjugation of one people by
another: that ‘the oppressive order is a “free society”’ marked by equality among people who
are ‘free to work where they wish’ and that anyone willing to work hard can attain success as
an entrepreneur; that this society of equals includes industrious ‘dominant elites’ who, by
virtue of their ‘charity and generosity’ work to ‘promote the advancement’ of the lazy,
dishonest, and naturally inferior people who, in gratitude, ‘should accept the words of the
elites and be conformed to them’; and that ‘rebellion is a sin against God’ (Freire, Pedagogy of
the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 135 36).
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by their efforts to teach the Castilian language and Catholic doctrine to the
indigenous peoples of the Americas.18
Even the use of particular words to describe individuals can be pressed
into the service of the society concerned. It is no accident that in Correa’s play
the Iberian forces are referred to as ‘españoles’ and ‘portugueses’
interchangeably or that when a character of either nationality uses some
form of ‘nuestro’ (I, 664; II, 68, 377, 512), it is often difficult to determine to
whom the term refers. The symbolic process of cohesion works to hide or erase
from consciousness the obvious differences among individuals, that is, to bring
all members to submit to the Other; for some, submission involves little effort
or struggle because the entrenched power structures reflect their own
individual status based upon race, class, sex, and the like, while for others
submission is tantamount to denial of one’s core values and identity.
Regardless of where one is in the hierarchy, people are trained to identify
with the goals, the values, and the institutions of the elites, and symbolic
acculturation is so effective that the need for more authoritarian measures
wanes over time as people adopt the ideology of the power structure. At the
moment when the Dutch attacked Bahia, no one could remember a time when
the peoples of Brazil had not been part of either Portugal or Spain. Generation
after generation had been assimilated by the teaching of Iberian languages,
and the peoples of the Americas had been rigorously evangelized into
Catholicism. After so many years under imperial rule, the notion of freedom
and independence virtually disappears from the realm of possibility. Indeed,
those with less power can actually be frightened of freedom, especially since it
‘is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and
responsibly’,19 an especially overwhelming challenge for people in a
relationship as asymmetrical as that between the indigenous peoples of
Brazil and the Europeans, at least as that relationship was defined at the
time. In essence, once a people have been successfully assimilated, they buy
into the ideals and mechanisms of oppression; in fact, so much do they ‘want
at any cost to resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow him’20 that ‘[i]t
is a rare peasant who, once “promoted” to overseer, does not become more of a
tyrant towards his former comrades than the owner himself’.21
Another manifestation of the symbolic is the human tendency to bond
with others like oneself, whether the defining characteristic is based on race,
18 Juan R. Lodares, ‘Languages, Catholicism, and Power in the Hispanic Empire (1500
1770)’, trans. Gerardo Garza & Kenya C. Dworkin y Méndez, in Spanish and Empire, ed. Nelsy
Echávez Solano & Kenya C. Dworkin y Méndez (Nashville: Vanderbilt U. P., 2007), 3 9, 12 19.
19 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 31.
20 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 49.
21 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 30. Further on in the work,
Freire reports that during a takeover of an estate by armed peasants, no peasant was willing to
stand guard over their former overlord. He ascribes this timidity to ‘guilt feelings’ or to an
assimilative process by which the oppressed perceived that ‘the boss was “inside” them’ (50 51).
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nationality, sex, language, or even personal preference. Recent research
reveals that babies less than one year old respond more positively to people
of the same or a familiar race and who speak their language, and even
assume that those with similar tastes in food to their own are nicer.22 So
strong is the need for fulfilment, for acceptance, for connection to others, and
for membership in an enterprise larger than oneself, and so persuasive is the
promised benefit, that one dismisses, sometimes repeatedly, evidence that
the Other not only will not but cannot fulfil its promises; these are, after all,
merely symbolic.
Evidence of the willingness of the individual to surrender his or her
autonomy to the larger community is found throughout Correa’s play, as well
as in the circumstances of its writing. The main characters on both sides and
of all nationalities, very few of whom reside permanently in Bahia and
therefore have little personal stake in the outcome, frequently cite loyalty to
others; their interest in the outcome is, to a considerable degree, indirect and
derivative, and more a function of allegiance to society, church, and crown
than of personal gain. The Portuguese, Spanish, and Neapolitan defenders
are bound by their common political allegiance to a single individual, Felipe
IV, to whom it is stated that Bahia rightfully belongs (II, 619–20). At the
same time that the union of different nations under one king allows for more
political and historical cohesion within the Iberian alliance, it also
establishes a recognized hierarchy in which all participants know where
they stand in relation to the centre of power; although the Portuguese and
Spanish fleets joined forces before crossing the Atlantic together, all aid from
Europe upon which the restoration of Iberian authority depends is
considered to come from Spain, dispatched by the monarch himself (II,
57–60).23
In addition to their loyalty to a single monarch, the Iberian forces are also
united via another layer of symbolic investment in their submission to the
Church of Rome, an overlapping imperative evident in the Bishop’s call to
the soldiers to fight in the name of God, His Spanish Majesty, and Saint
Anthony, Portugal’s patron saint, to reclaim the city from those who have
defiled convents and altars, and to do whatever is necessary for Portugal to
win: ‘Portugal ha de ser siempre inuencible’ (I, 624). This is an assertion that
is perhaps technically accurate but that strikes one as odd considering that
Portugal itself was at that very moment ruled by the King of Spain and
22 See Paul Bloom, ‘The Moral Life of Babies,’ New York Times Magazine, 9 May
2010, p. MM44, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/magazine/09babies t.html> (accessed
2 October 2012).
23 While specific members of the Iberian alliance are indeed described as Portuguese
(Diego de Mendoza, Francisco de Mora, Manuel de Meneses and María and Daphne, the two
women who play important roles in the amorous subplots) or Italian (the Marqués de
Torrecuso, the sergeant major), those without a clearly identified national identity are
assumed to be Spanish.
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within fifteen years would rebel against the once-praised monarch in order to
re-establish itself as an independent and sovereign kingdom. That the man
exhorting the troops to victory is also the Bishop reveals the importance of
religion as yet another marker for unity or division, especially when the
political and religious institutions are so closely linked. This is not just a
battle between Spain and Holland; it is a conflict between the faithful and
the heretical (II, 492, 528). The Bishop even repeats the symbolic imperative
expressed in the link, familiar in the Comedia, between honour and death: it
is better to die for a cause greater than oneself than to strive to hold on to
anything to which one has any kind of personal attachment such as an
occupied land, a treasure in gold, or a loved one (see I, 601; II, 144–46,
595–96).
With few exceptions, empires encourage all of their members, regardless
of their positions in the hierarchy, to believe that they are active participants
in the advancement of the aims of society and, concomitantly, in the
betterment of their individual lives; at the same time, those with less
(power, money, status, etc.) are encouraged to look upon those with more as
models for the ‘possibility of their own ascent’.24 This strategic balance
between incentives for loyalty to a superstructure that is greater but more
remote and abstract on the one hand, and more local, parochial, or personal
on the other, creates a system of mutually reinforcing behaviour: the
powerless will continue to carry out the wishes of the powerful in order
to be rewarded (and feel good about themselves), and the powerful will
continue to dole out rewards (money, food, marginal status) in order to entice
the powerless to continue doing their bidding. Indeed, the more successful
the identification with the values of the elites, the more reinforced the elites
are, and feel themselves to be, to continue or even intensify and expand their
political and cultural dominance.25
Both the Portuguese and the Spanish, despite their differences at home,
find themselves motivated to defend the other. From the point of view of the
Spanish, it was right and proper for the Portuguese, both those living in
Brazil and those coming from Europe, to aid the efforts of the Spanish
monarch who ruled them to re-establish dominion over his personal property
and to ensure that the American colony remained resolutely Catholic. For the
Portuguese, despite their understanding that Bahia was Portuguese, not
Castilian, the Spanish had an obligation to protect Portuguese interests and
send aid to retake the colony.
The acceptance of a hierarchical power structure coupled with the
expectation that one will give one’s life to benefit the larger group is
intensified in the play due to the military nature of the action. In addition
to direct exhortations for personal sacrifice, tales of loyalty and heroism, such
24
25

Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Bergman Ramos, 144.
B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 28.
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as the brave death of Pedro Osorio (II, 483–84), the extraordinary valour of
the Marqués de Coprani (II, 493–96), and the willingness of a Portuguese
soldier, Carvallo, to give his life for his monarch (II, 539–43), are common
examples designed to bind together a group of men for a higher purpose.26
This kind of selflessness is expected of loyal soldiers; as Fadrique tells
Carvallo, to be willing to give one’s life for the King of Spain is to act as any
Portuguese soldier would (II, 551–52). Victory, of course, also creates new
demands and new incentives to work harder to reproduce the feelings of
success and satisfaction. That each individual and group should both help
and expect support from the other, and then celebrate the eventual victory
together, goes a long way toward serving the purpose of convincing the
soldiers themselves of the rightness of both the cause and the strategy to
attain it, as well as demonstrating to the broader public that the union of
both kingdoms is mutually beneficial even though in the short run it serves
the interests of Spain and her king more than those of Portugal.
Success is not exclusively a function of symbolic incentives, however; as
powerful as the symbolic imperatives are in inspiring both those with power
and those without to work toward common goals, there are also significant
imaginary incentives. One enters into alliances for reasons that are not just
sociological but psychological in nature. In an act of denial of the essential
lack at the core of the human subject, each individual creates imaginary
ideals of happiness, wholeness, self-sufficiency, and superiority, and devises
strategies to attempt to fulfil them.27 Military culture is particularly adept at
manipulating imaginary rewards that feed an individual’s fantasy of power.
The binary conception of battle (us/them, good/evil) as the struggle of two
rivals (individuals, armies, nations, alliances) to possess the same object
(territory, power, wealth, loved one) does not just intensify the desire for
victory, it actually creates the desire; one does not happen to desire the same
object as another person, one desires it because the other person does.28
Thus, even if an Italian soldier or perhaps one of the voiceless ‘negros’ had
26 The military command structure makes even more evident and effective Freire’s
assertions that ‘[b]y means of manipulation, the dominant elites try to conform the masses to
their objectives’, and that ‘[m]anipulation, like the conquest whose objectives it serves,
attempts to anesthetize the people so they will not think’ (Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed,
trans. Bergman Ramos, 144, 146).
27 For specific references to those aspects of the imaginary noted here, see Lacan, Écrits,
trans. Sheridan, 2, 4 7, 10, 15, 17 18, 20 21, 23, 45, 70, 80, 134, 137 39, 191 98, 233, 296, 302
24; Lacan, The Seminar I, ed. Miller, 52 53, 62 63, 68 69, 76 80, 86, 102, 109, 115 16, 122 26,
137, 139 42, 146 49, 153, 167, 169 72, 176 77, 194, 217, 222 23, 271, 276 77, 281 82. For an
overview of the imaginary register in the context of a study of the Comedia, see Stroud, The
Play in the Mirror, 28 31, 37 39, 49 50, 57 59, 65 71, 107 09, 113 15, 128 29, 185 88,
215 19.
28 See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins U. P., 1977), 145; see also Lacan, Seminar I, ed. Miller, 147, 170, 176 77; Stroud, The
Play in the Mirror, 29 30.
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no personal stake in the battle for Bahia, the mere fact that others wanted to
occupy the town, some of whom were his comrades and others his enemies,
would be enough to inspire an affinity for the Spanish and Portuguese
fighting alongside him, as well as his desire for victory over the enemy.
Related to desire for an object is the even stronger motivation to defend
what one already has. Once one has an object in one’s possession, a
territorial sense of entitlement causes one to expend even more effort to
hold onto it than might have been spent to attain something new. Although
the Portuguese had only held Bahia for a bit over a century, and the Spanish
even less, in their minds it is their property, not that of the indigenous
Brazilians or the black population among them, and certainly not that of the
Dutch, the English, or the French. As a ‘ “beleaguered” victim fighting a
“defensive” struggle […]’,29 those rushing to defend Bahia from the Dutch
see themselves not as imperial villains who impose their values and rules on
unwilling victims, but as protectors of civilization who justifiably struggle to
defend their natural territory against the illegitimate desires of outsiders, a
motivation that allows for greater fervour and a more deeply felt willingness
to put differences aside and work together on the side of Spain and Portugal.
Another potent imaginary reinforcement is the tribal aspect inherent in
praise for us and opprobrium for them. In battle settings in general and this
play in particular, both sides in the conflict are called and consider
themselves to be noble (I, 570), invincible (I, 37, 610; II, 443), fierce (II, 96,
244; see also I, 79), valiant (II, 84, 117, 136, 455), prudent (II, 84) and famous
(I, 50; II, 125, 127) for their long traditions of winning in battle (II, 636–37);
even when defeat appears inevitable, the Dutch general still praises his
fearful men in an effort to encourage them to fight on (II, 367–71). The other
side of the same coin, of course, is the demonization of the common enemy.
Despite the fact that both they and their foes are of different nationalities
and religions, those fighting to reclaim Bahia consider all their enemies to be
Dutch (I, 42), heretics (II, 67, 492), arrogant (I, 104; II, 104, 144, 399, 405),
and less than human (‘perro’, II, 398, 401), and, simultaneously, so
formidable and determined (‘brauo’ [III, 106]; ‘fuerça’ [III, 139]) that the
triumph over them will surely redound to the greater honour and glory for
29 Burningham, Tilting Cervantes, 10. Burningham primarily focuses here on historical
plays that recount the precarious and often uncertain future of the Spanish state during the
Reconquista. Such plays
remind their audiences[…] that there was a time when the nation was very much under
siege, when there still existed the very real threat of complete cultural dissolution at the
hands of an enemy who very much wanted to destroy everything the nation valued and
stood for. (Burningham, Tilting Cervantes, 30)
More contemporaneous threats, such as those posed by competing nations (England, France,
The Netherlands) and religions (Protestantism, Islam), served as potent motivations for the
disparate components of the empire to rally to the cause of its defence.
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the victor. Likewise, the Dutch captain Guillermo praises the Portuguese in
general and Manuel de Meneses in particular, and reveres the great Don
Fadrique de Toledo (II, 242–55). These imaginary motivations are closely
linked to the notion of free will; when a soldier advances through the ranks,
takes home plunder, is praised for his efforts, or is otherwise rewarded or
enriched for his efforts, he takes this as a sign that he deserves credit for
having done something deemed to be good.30 The medals, praise and flattery
that the officers shower on the troops, combined with the opportunities for
power, wealth and personal distinction, appeal to their imaginary fantasies
of power and dignity and reinforce actions that an individual might otherwise
have had no incentive to undertake. Rather than question why the power
structure should reward the particular actions in question, the soldiers are
pleased to believe that they are being rewarded for who they are, what they
have done, and why they have done it. In other words, part of the military
strategy lies in creating an imaginary identity of oneself as strong, superior,
competent, brave, masculine, and deserving, and providing an opportunity to
prove oneself in battle against an enemy that is simultaneously worthy yet
undeserving; taken together, these two conceptions of self and other inflate
the ego of the individual soldier and create psychological attachments among
the different subgroups (English and French, Spanish and Portuguese,
blacks and whites) that did not exist among the same nations back home in
Europe.
This nexus of pride, the fantasy of invincibility, the possibility of personal
advancement or enrichment (via either authorized rewards or plunder), the
approval of one’s superiors and one’s society, and, generally, the feeling that
one is worthy of praise and status, will no doubt call to mind that overarching
theme of early modern Spanish literature: honour. So skilful is military
culture at manipulating both imaginary and symbolic motivators that the
more one acts in the interests of others (one’s comrades, one’s unit, one’s
army, one’s nation), the more personal glory one attains. Maintaining a
subtle balance between obedience and encouragement, superior officers
simultaneously command, coerce, and threaten their men and exhort them
to work together for goals that do not immediately benefit them as
individuals by appealing to their sense of imagined greatness. Thus, by
inflating one’s own sense of egoistic power and invincibility while also
encouraging one to risk everything for the larger symbolic entities of king
and crown, the imaginary and the symbolic registers work together to ensure
the success of the interests of the hegemonic structure. The feelings of power,
strength and wealth, as well as the emotional well-being that comes with
success, are most seductive, and human beings naturally want to share in it.
Indeed, there appears to be no limit to imaginary desire or symbolic
demands, as both the Dutch after their initial victory (I, 369–74), and the
30

Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 45 47.
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Spanish after retaking Bahia (III, 744–47), hope to go on to conquer the
entire world.
Opportunities for counter-hegemonic liberation exist even in absurdly
asymmetric relationships because, despite their promises, neither the
symbolic nor the imaginary can fulfil the promises of harmony and
homogeneity, of superiority and totality; even royal grandeur, imperial
might and religious orthodoxy cannot eliminate the frictions and fault lines
beneath the surface of the most united alliance. A cursory description of the
central conflict of the battle for Bahia reveals that the easy division between
the Dutch and the Spanish cannot hold. The Spanish alliance was clearly
more united than the opposition, but there is a reason that the Spanish
monarch was referred to as the ‘rey de las Españas’.31 Although Brazil
had only been a colony of Spain for less than fifty years,32 the forces that
came to its rescue reflected the diverse nationalities, languages, cultures,
and histories of Felipe IV’s subjects: Castilians, Aragonese, Navarrese,
Neapolitans, Portuguese, Brazilians, and even the voiceless ‘negros’. The
history of relations between Castilla and its subordinates in the Spanish
empire, especially in Cataluña, the Basque Country, the Low Countries and
Portugal, reveals considerable historical and contemporary tensions; not only
did the Portuguese nobility resent the preferential treatment of their
counterparts during the ‘Spanish captivity’,33 but Spanish conflicts with
both the Netherlands and England interfered with Portugal’s ties to its
colonies and to trading partners, especially in Asia. Even in the context of
this battle, there was considerable consternation among the Portuguese that
Castilian forces had pillaged the city of goods that had rightfully belonged to
the Portuguese before the Dutch incursion, prompting an ‘ink war’ in the
Peninsula regarding exactly what kind of relationship existed between the
Castilians and the Portuguese in this troubled, forced, political marriage.34
31 Although this term per se is not mentioned in Correa’s play, its currency is made clear
by the title of the book by Gonzalo de Céspedes y Meneses, Primera parte de la historia de d.
Felipe el IIII, Rey de las Españas (Lisboa: Pedro Craesbeeck, 1631).
32 The Portuguese King Sebastião died in his attempt to conquer Morocco in 1578, was
succeeded by his great uncle, Cardinal Henry, who died two years later having produced no
heir and having failed to establish a Council of Regency to appoint a successor. The closest
living relative with a claim to the throne was the Habsburg king of Spain, Felipe II.
33 Lisa Voigt, Writing Captivity in the Early Modern Atlantic: Circulations of Knowledge
and Authority in the Iberian and English Imperial Worlds (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 2009), 209.
34 Carlos Ziller Camenietzki & Gianriccardo Grassia Pastore, ‘1625, Fire and Ink: The
Battle of Salvador in Accounts of the War’, trans. Eoin O’Neill, Topoi: Revista de História, 2
(2006), n.p., <http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci arttext&pid=S1518 3319200
6000200001> (accessed 2 October 2012). For the original version in Portuguese, titled ‘1625, o
Fogo e a Tinta: a batalha de Salvador nos relatos de guerra’, see Topoi: Revista de História,
6:11 (2005), 261 88 (pp. 262, 281 82).
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Just as victory brings unity, thus making it easier for the army to fulfil its
role as ‘the permanent reserve of “order” ’, to ‘appear neutral and rise above
“factions” ’,35 defeat, on the other hand, brings recrimination, blame,
hostility, and regret, and causes the fault lines to come much more visibly
to the surface. The first defeat is that of the Portuguese, who lose their
fortress to the Dutch in Act 1. The defeat is humbling (‘mas valiera quedar
muerto’ [I, 424]), and Antonio, the son of the governor, accuses the
Portuguese of valuing their own lives over honour and fame (I, 51–52, 94–
96). Redemption will be theirs if they fight on to retake the city or die trying,
but only dishonour will await them should they survive in defeat (I, 7–8, 38–
39, 72–75). Struggling to recoup a bit of self-respect, the Portuguese governor
makes it clear that the colony fell only because it was overpowered by the
larger Dutch force (I, 65–66, 387–88), not because of lack of valour, honour, or
a willingness to fight on the part of his men. Moreover, he vows that the
‘soberbia arrogancia’ of the Dutch will end up ‘rendida a mis pies’ (I, 104–
05), and that the stronger and more numerous Dutch will be ‘abrasados en
las llamas / de mi lealtad, ofrecida / al Quarto Leon de España’ (I, 140–42).36
Whatever tensions are shown to exist here within the Iberian alliance,
however, they are as nothing compared to those present among the forces
fighting for Holland. In history, these forces may have had common goals—to
harass the Spanish and Portuguese, diminish the Iberian influence in the
Americas, and increase their own stake in the treasures of the New World—
but they were anything but inseparable allies, equal partners, or even unified
peoples within each nation. The two nascent empires of England and France
had a long and bloody history of war and rivalry as well as internal
instabilities, and they both looked down on the Netherlands, which at the
time was not a nation but a union of semi-autonomous provinces.37 Most
importantly from a political perspective, the Dutch had only declared their
independence from Spain in 1575, and the war to determine the outcome of
the dispute would not end until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This meant
that, at least from one point of view, the Netherlands, having been
incorporated into the Spanish empire with the accession to the throne of
Carlos V in 1517, still belonged to the King of Spain. In other words, the
Dutch move to take Bahia was not only an attempt (along with its more
significant efforts in Pernambuco) to enlarge its American colonial presence,
35 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 237, 239.
36 This conflicted idea of the strength and failure of Portugal in its relationship with
Spain and the Habsburg monarchy perhaps hints at tensions between the two Iberian powers
and foreshadows the Portuguese rebellion against Felipe IV in 1640 in which Portugal re
established its independence, thus depriving Spain of the coveted colony of Brazil for good.
37 The House of Orange, created only in the sixteenth century, was considered to be of
significantly less stature than the Bourbons or the Stuarts. As it turned out, the Dutch
Stadhouder, Maurits van Oranje, died on 23 April 1625, just eight days before Bahia was
reclaimed by the Iberian alliance.
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but was also an attack on Spain during their long war for independence.38
Thus, the presumptive lead nation in this alliance against Spain was
essentially the junior partner, one that was not only militarily weaker but
that commanded less respect and authority than its allies, creating
instability in the chain of command and in the perceived natural order.
Finally, the political tension within the Dutch-led alliance was coupled with
enormous religious conflicts not only between Catholics and Protestants, but
also among Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists and other Protestant sects, a
situation which contributes to the lack of unity which is made evident from
the beginning of the play. Still flush with victory, the invaders allow their
personal desires to take precedence over the common military goal as they
fight among themselves over the spoils of war (I, 260 ff.). Such rivalry may
solidify the bonds among comrades when they find themselves on the same
side of a conflict, but within an alliance of several different nations or
nationalities, rivalry for the same object of desire causes significant rifts and
interferes with unit cohesion, and so the internal divisions are shown to
become greater as the tide turns against the Dutch. Early in Act 2, several
Englishmen flee Bahia (II, 13–14) and the Dutch general laments having
joined together Dutch and English forces because he does not trust the
English Catholics (II, 194–97; III, 165–68). Thus it is no surprise that
members of both camps characterize the Dutch alliance as having fallen into
‘civil guerra’ (II, 20, 600). After all, it is in Correa’s interest to differentiate
the loose and fractious alliance of Spain’s enemies from the relatively more
coordinated, cooperative, productive and peaceful allied forces fighting for
and under the King of Spain.
One of Correa’s masterstrokes is the way in which he relates the main
action to two subplots, which are used to reflect the discord within the Dutch
alliance, have a bearing on the final outcome of the play, and highlight the
different imaginary and symbolic imperatives affecting this outcome. Each
subplot involves a love triangle in which two members of the Dutch-led
coalition desire the same woman. In both cases, not only are the two
competing suitors brought into conflict, but the conduct of each of them is
in itself deeply conflicted. Each individual is part of a military hierarchy in
which he is expected to perform in an obedient and unquestioning manner;
yet at the same time he prizes his personal honour above all. As frequently
happens in the Comedia, various definitions of honour are exemplified in the
character’s behaviour, ranging from a sense of moral virtue to a belief that
each one rightly deserves whatever may come his way as a result of his
actions, to a deeply held conviction that it is his responsibility to help the
weak, the vulnerable, and the needy. In the less prominent of the two
38 One irony is that if Spain had been able to defeat the Dutch in their struggle for
independence and put down the Portuguese rebellion of 1640, Bahia would never have been
lost to Spain and the battle would have been reduced to an internal fight over which Spanish
dependency would administer it.
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subplots, Guillermo, a captain, and his general both desire the same
Portuguese woman, Daphne. For Guillermo, she is the only possession he
has been able to obtain in this battle (I, 439–42), and it is significant that he
treats her as spoils of war (it is only later that he conflates his desire for her
with love, I, 488). She, of course, wants nothing to do with him because he is
Dutch, and therefore is ‘barbaro, atreuido, loco’ (I, 470). Moreover, she values
her honour too much to accept his attentions, and she finds it preposterous
that a man should declare his love for her only two hours after first laying
eyes on her (I, 489). When he threatens her if she does not welcome his
advances, she appeals to the Dutch general to defend her from Guillermo’s
overtures (I, 504–06). The general intervenes, telling the captain that a man
who forces himself upon a captive woman loses more (honour) than (the
pleasure) he gains (I, 554–56). However, Daphne’s beauty is so extraordinary
that the general himself falls for her (I, 504–69 passim). The general orders
Guillermo to leave her alone (thus removing an obstacle for the general’s own
desire), but, despite his promise to obey the general’s order to leave Daphne
in peace, Guillermo swears that he will not let their difference in rank
prevent him from pursuing the object of his desire (I, 509–13), and later
mutters that he is burning with rage and swears to take revenge on the
general for his interest in the Portuguese woman (II, 157–58). In this
instance, apparently, love, and the rivalry it provokes, trumps allegiance to
a superior officer and even to the Dutch cause. Somewhat later, the general,
as one might expect in a play intended to cast the Dutch in a negative light,
also tries to force his attentions on Daphne: he will enjoy her or kill her
(II, 841). A virtuous subject of the Spanish crown, Daphne will have none of
it, declaring that it is not love that motivates him but ‘apetito’ (II, 844); that
the mountains will be laid low, night will be turned into day, land into sea,
the lion into the lamb, and fire into ice before she submits; and that love
cannot be obtained by force: ‘no ay voluntad forçada’ (II, 868).39
The other love triangle involves an English captain, Rugero, who, like
Guillermo, deviates from the actions expected of him according to his rank
in the military hierarchy and his national and religious allegiances. Unlike
Guillermo, whose treacherous plan to attack his own general in order to
possess Daphne is motivated by selfishness and a sense of entitlement,
Rugero opposes those he fights alongside for noble and praiseworthy
reasons. Early in Act 1, he comes to the defence of a young woman,
María, who, like Daphne, finds herself the object of unwanted attention
(I, 165–66). Since Rugero is also an invader, her initial reaction when he
appears is one of fear and she rejects his help (I, 153–59), but he explains
his two reasons for helping her. First, he makes clear that he wishes to
39 Interestingly, despite such words of rejection, Daphne goes on to say that she might
give him what he wants if he were Catholic and he married her (II, 905 07), which indicates
that for Daphne, at least at some level, love matters less than her honour and allegiance to her
faith, which are paramount.
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protect her from mistreatment, thus demonstrating that his allegiance to
his own side is less strong than his desire to protect her from those who see
her only as an object to be possessed and not as a human being worthy of
dignity and respect. Second, although in a military sense she may be under
his control, he declares he is her captive in love: ‘dueño, y esclauo soy yo’
(I, 187). He goes on to explain not only that his father was born in Spain,
but that he is Catholic, and that he would gladly take her back to England
with him if she would agree. His kind, generous demeanour and honourable
offer, coupled with his mixed heritage that bridges the two sides of the
conflict (‘Inglés, ô Español cortes’ [I, 223]), lead her to echo the amorous
metaphor he has used and declare that she is his ‘esclaua’ (I, 227)—which,
in her case is true literally and not just figuratively. For María, Rugero’s
Catholicism and his paternal Spanish nationality are more important than
his current allegiance to the King of England and the havoc which the
Dutch and their allies have caused in Bahia. Within a hundred lines of their
first encounter, Rugero has promised to take her to back to Europe where
she will be his lady (I, 247–50), and she has agreed to be his wife
(I, 252–53).
Rugero’s rival is Rigepe, another captain serving on the side of the
Dutch alliance. He has staked his honour as a Frenchman on his ability to
win over María (‘no seré / el Frances, sino la gozo’ [I, 345–46]), and his
attitude toward his rival is marked not by generosity and nobility but by
intense emotions (‘furor’ [I, 304]; ‘abrasando’ [I, 324]) and threats of
violence (‘veneno’ [I, 312]; ‘sacrifico’ [I, 323]). Like Guillermo in his
attitude to the general (II, 186), Rugero views his rival as an obstacle to
be overcome by lethal force if necessary (II, 178, 188–89). The two fight
over María (who herself at one point enters dressed as a man in order to
defend Rugero [II, 702–03]), but their attitudes are polar opposites. Rugero
tries to reason with Rigepe, even allowing the latter to recover when he
falls (II, 705) or drops his sword (II, 733). Such is Rigepe’s confused state
of mind that even as he gives up, asking Rugero to kill him (II, 739),
he continues to threaten to kill Rugero though by then he has no weapon
(II, 787). On witnessing how Rugero calmly defeats the raging Rigepe, and
evaluating them within the context of their different motivations
(marriage vs. possession), María is moved to love Rugero even more
(II, 803–04). The two lovers look forward to the end of the hostilities
when they can marry (II, 826–38).
At the beginning of Act 3, Correa merges the two subplots when Rigepe
and Guillermo, united in their respective desires for two local woman as
well as by a murderous jealousy of a comrade at arms, find in each other a
companion in their misery. Rigepe confides his sorrow to Guillermo,
bemoaning the fact that Rugero has deprived him of both his honour and
María. They may be fellow captains on the same side of the conflict, but
Rigepe’s wounded pride demands his rival’s death (III, 33–36). For his
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part, Guillermo recounts the unhappiness he has suffered as a result of his
feelings for Daphne and the fact that he is in a subordinate position to the
general (III, 41–60); his emotional reaction to the loss of the woman he
desires leads him not just to seek revenge but to commit treason by
plotting to kill his commanding officer (III, 57–60). The imaginary impulse
to destroy one’s rival is so great in Rigepe and Guillermo that they
consider joining forces against the Dutch-led alliance and so to enable the
Spanish to retake Bahia; they are aware that if they were simply to refuse
to fight they would in essence succeed in turning Bahia over to the
Spanish (III, 64). To counter Guillermo’s concern that they will be
dishonoured if they fail to fight, Rigepe assures him that there is a way
that they can both obey orders, yet still do their part in allowing the
Spanish to retake Bahia, thus making both Rugero and the general pay for
their ‘soberuias’ (III, 84). This word ‘soberuias’ is an interesting and
ironically used term in this context since it is these two jealous men who
are valuing their own desires in love over the greater need of their
comrades in war and the crowns for which they fight. As the battle turns
in favour of the Spanish, Rigepe urges the general to surrender, saying
that their forces are few, the valour of the Spanish is great, and that it is
better to live as a slave after a Spanish victory than for them to die in a
siege (III, 105–14). Despite the general’s insistence that they continue to
fight to save their honour, the soldiers are influenced more by Rigepe and
Guillermo, and shout as one that the city should be surrendered in order
to save their lives (III, 150). Guillermo and Rigepe, two characters
motivated so intensely by imaginary rivalry and ego-driven lust, thus
convince their comrades on the Dutch side to raise the white flag of
surrender (III, 190, 205). Ungracious in defeat, the general appears to take
little personal responsibility for the loss, first noting that he could never
rely on the ‘Christianos Ingleses’ and their ‘pecho falso’ (III, 165–68; see
also II, 170–73, 823–24; III, 655), and later, in self-pity, laments his ill
fortune (III, 750). Too late, Guillermo repents of his plans for revenge as
he is left with nothing: no victory, no honour and no love (III, 604–05). The
actions of Guillermo and Rigepe serve to demonstrate that symbolic
superstructures have only limited success when they are in conflict with
such basic instincts as love, passion, sexual rivalry, and jealousy.
The coming together of the main plot and the subplots enables for the
Iberians a kind of apotheosis of ideals revered in the Spanish Comedia:
valour, honour, masculinity, success, chivalry and devotion to the Roman
Catholic Church. Bahia will once again be ‘nuestra’ (III, 176); all who fight in
the name of Felipe IV share in the glory of victory, and even the dead can be
considered to have triumphed because the souls of the fallen will find
immortal life (III, 256–57). Fadrique demonstrates his magnanimity as he
ignores assertions that the ‘perros Luteros’ (III, 514) will be consigned to
eventual damnation (III, 548–49) and rejects calls that the Dutch captains be
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put to death (III, 370–71, 514). Now that the hostilities have ended, it is
imperative that the terms of surrender do not humiliate the vanquished
enemy but rather that they restore the regular order with which all nobles,
even enemies, treat each other. Indeed, to act so harshly against their
enemies would dishonour the victors: ‘es afrenta dar la muerte / al que
humillado se vé’ (III, 299–300; see also III, 598–601).40 Honour and dignity
are more important than baser emotions, and the Dutch will suffer enough
because of their loss of power and possessions as well as through their
internal conflicts (III, 266–72). By overruling the desire of his men for
revenge, Fadrique ensures that all involved might re-establish their
respective places as being in subordination to the even greater power of the
empire.
To drive home the point of the play, the focus shifts to two allegorical
figures, España and Fama, who recap the events of the battle, condemning
the actions of the Dutch (III, 385–96) and glorifying the heroism of all who
fought for the Iberian alliance. As this play sees it, and no doubt its
spectators at the time heartily agreed, Felipe IV, favoured by God, has
defeated the usurpers by a winning force of greater numbers and superior
valour [III, 412–19]). Clearly, the purpose of this scene is to serve as a lesson
to the public, to praise what was regarded as the monolithic homogeneity,
and the hegemony, of the Spanish-Portuguese union. Furthermore, the
Portuguese, says Fama, should not be ashamed of having lost Bahia to the
Dutch; Felipe IV considers Portugal’s concerns to be his own:
El Reyno de Portugal
no se descuyda, que causas
de su Rey, son propias suyas,
y assi junta fuerte Armada. (III, 428–311)
Fama concludes with the names of those who ‘a seruir tu Rey / fueron’ (III,
484–85). After this bit of pageantry, the Dutch are ordered to render to
Fadrique, in the name of the Spanish monarch (III, 494–96), not just the
fortress and city but everything they have brought with them or have
acquired in Brazil (III, 342–59, 524–30, 554–58). They will be afforded safe
passage back to Europe with only their clothes, a few personal possessions,
and enough light arms necessary to defend themselves at sea (III, 580–83,
40 A similar opinion was expressed earlier in the play when Coprani told Faro that one
should not kill the vanquished; ‘antes es mayor grandeza / dexar que con vida salga’ (II, 424
25). These attitudes reveal that class, too, is definitely an influence here. Those who are elites
have more in common with the elites in other societies than they do with the subordinate
populations in their own society. In military terms, this can mean that in a conflict officers,
especially, respect and feel a special kinship with the officers on the opposing side, offering
them the honour and courtesy seen to be due to their rank and nobility, even when to accord
such privileged treatment to their opponents seems to run counter to the overall military
mission concerned and the wishes of those on their own side of lower rank.
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618–20). Captives who are being held in Holland will be returned to Spain
(III, 676–78). This section concludes with the hope that the King of Spain
may someday rule over all lands upon which the sun and the moon shine (III,
744–47).
The play ends, not with the military triumph as such, but with the return
of Rugero to the cultural and religious fold. The English captain reveals to
Fadrique his Spanish heritage, his Catholicism, his dismay at the sight of the
sacked churches (III, 792–97), his love for María, and his intention to return
with her to Spain where they will live in Lisbon (Lisbon being thus
understood to lie firmly within the borders of Spain [III, 241]). Rugero asks
the general for his blessing, and Fadrique grants his request, adding that he
will be the godfather at their wedding (III, 825). The manner of the
conclusion is meant to offer us a number of lessons regarding how
individual desires should relate to and be distinguished from social
demands. Thus, in contrast to the actions of Guillermo and Rigepe,
Rugero’s conduct shows us that love is not necessarily incompatible with
honour, courtesy, and gentlemanly behaviour. He is able to express his
desires without resorting to violence and without compromising his
principles, and he ends up with the woman he loves. The play’s outcome
shows, too, that if one gives oneself over to the baser emotions of anger,
jealousy, and revenge, one harms not only oneself but the larger community.
The conclusion also demonstrates that aligning oneself with power can prove
to be personally advantageous. Not only are Guillermo and Rigepe on the
wrong side of the conflict between Spain and Holland, their treachery means
that they also find themselves in opposition to their own military hierarchy.
Rugero, on the other hand, succeeds at the final curtain because he has
proved his love for María in a way that is compatible with honour and
gentlemanly courtesy, he has accepted the greater power of Spain and
Portugal, and he has reaffirmed his faith in the Church triumphant. In short,
he has pursued his love within the bounds of decorum as prescribed by
Spain’s army, its society, its Church and its king.
On a more general level, one notes the symmetry between the conquest of
a woman by a man and that of a colony or nation by an empire. In both love
and war, some people and countries resist the dominant force and others give
in. Just as Daphne rejects Guillermo and María embraces Rugero, Brazil can
be said to reject the attentions of its new suitor, Holland, and return to the
arms of Spain. In both love and war, desire for possession itself is sufficient
for one to feel entitled to or deserving of what is desired; and any rival who
desires the same object will be seen as an enemy to be destroyed. Moreover,
failure to pursue the object of desire at all costs may result in the loss of
honour and valour, and perhaps even in death, either figuratively or in
reality. Both types of endeavour, whether amatory or military, offer potential
rewards, but also incur risks. While motivations derived from feelings of love
and sexual desires may be much stronger than those that are determined by
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political allegiance or military discipline, they do not necessarily lead to
success; as Rigepe finds out, one cannot force love upon an unwilling subject.
As the play also teaches, neither can an empire succeed if its members do not
yield to the demands of the group, the society, and the ruler concerned.
Success, on the other hand, can create its own dynamic: the greater the
conquest, the greater the stature, the greater the desire for it, and the
greater the entitlement to it. The benefits that are promised to those who
align their imaginary, personal desires with the symbolic, imperial
imperatives are, the play declares, virtually limitless: ‘poco es el mundo
para su trofeo’ (II, 101).
As we pull back from its focus on the battle to the play as a whole, we
discover that the very existence of Correa’s celebration of the retaking of
Bahia reinforces the same cultural dynamics that we see reflected in the plot.
Although we cannot be sure of the exact circumstances of the writing or
performance of this play other than that Correa was apparently born in
Lisbon and that his play was written before 1670,41 it is possible to make
some reasonable assumptions. The play was probably written shortly after
news of the victory reached Spain, and, if so, would have been composed in
order to curry favour with the Spanish monarch as well as to please a paying
audience in Spain, providing its spectators both with news and details of a
great victory and with the occasion for national celebration. No doubt,
Correa, like Lope de Vega, chose to highlight the failure of the Portuguese to
hold Bahia in 1624 in order to underscore how essential it was for the
Spanish to intervene in order to reclaim this important imperial asset. The
fact that the Portuguese-born playwright should choose to write the work in
Spanish should come as no surprise, especially considering the cultural
importance of Spanish in the Iberian Peninsula for over a century (due in
part to the presence of Spanish queens on the throne of Portugal), and the
radical shift of power that inevitably took place during the period of Spanish
rule over Portugal from 1580 to 1640. Other factors that would have
influenced Correa’s choice of language include the existence in Spain,
especially in Madrid, of much more highly developed public and court
theatres, and the amount of support for the arts in Spain from Spanish
patrons and, of course, from the king. This play, written in Castilian by a
native of Lisbon to celebrate a Spanish victory, and for performance before
the general public no doubt, not just a courtly audience, is additional
evidence of the extent of Spain’s cultural hegemony beyond Spain itself and
into Portugal and their overseas empires.
In conclusion, both the historical facts and details about the battle of
Bahia (the various alliances and allegiances formed by both sides in this
conflict), as well as the existence of this play written by a native of Portugal
to celebrate the Spanish recovery of Brazil from its control by rival imperial
41

See Lisboa, Uma peça desconhecida, ‘Introdução’, xiv, xx.
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powers, serve to show that such empires are not built or maintained by their
armed forces alone. In their efforts to motivate subordinate populations into
accepting and even actively supporting the imperial hegemony which
dominates them, colonial powers employ a variety of mechanisms: military,
religious, personal, social, cultural and artistic. By using every strategy
available to pursue their goals, empires masterfully create incentives so that
individuals, though they may speak of the ideals of liberty, individuality, and
autonomy, given the chance, cast their lot with the elites in order to reap the
benefits of associations with power, wealth, and status. The real genius of
empire appears to lie in its ability to induce normal people to give their
loyalty and support to those to whom they might otherwise be indifferent or
even hostile, and to do so at great personal cost in the belief that the benefits
outweigh the sacrifices; and all this is done in pursuit of imaginary fantasies
and the fulfilment of what, at heart, amounts only to a symbolic promise.

